Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Author(s) / Creator(s)
Bénabou, Roland
Tirole, Jean
Abstract / Description
We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this 'overjustification effect' can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the choice by public and private sponsors of incentive levels, their degree of confidentiality and the publicity given to agents' behavior. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.
Keyword(s)
Altruismus Belohnung Motivation Prestige NormPersistent Identifier
Date of first publication
2005
Is part of series
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;1695
Citation
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dp1695.pdfAdobe PDF - 491.63KBMD5: af7629291cf099570598b7912a924adc
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There are no other versions of this object.
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Bénabou, Roland
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Tirole, Jean
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PsychArchives acquisition timestamp2022-11-17T11:06:52Z
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Made available on2008-06-06
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Made available on2015-12-01T10:32:11Z
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Made available on2022-11-17T11:06:52Z
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Date of first publication2005
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Abstract / DescriptionWe develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this 'overjustification effect' can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the choice by public and private sponsors of incentive levels, their degree of confidentiality and the publicity given to agents' behavior. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.en
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Persistent Identifierhttps://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bsz:291-psydok-16636
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Persistent Identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11780/1104
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Persistent Identifierhttps://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.9121
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Language of contenteng
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Is part ofIZA Discussion Paper Series No. 1695
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Is part of seriesForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;1695
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Keyword(s)Altruismusde
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Keyword(s)Belohnungde
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Keyword(s)Motivationde
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Keyword(s)Prestigede
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Keyword(s)Normde
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Keyword(s)Moralde
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Keyword(s)Begierdede
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Keyword(s)Psychologiede
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Keyword(s)Altruismusde
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Keyword(s)Belohnungde
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Keyword(s)Motivationde
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Keyword(s)Prestigede
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Keyword(s)Normde
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Keyword(s)Moralde
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Keyword(s)Begierdede
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Keyword(s)Psychologiede
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Keyword(s)altruismen
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Keyword(s)rewardsen
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Keyword(s)motivationen
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Keyword(s)esteemen
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Keyword(s)crowding outen
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Keyword(s)overjustification effecten
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Keyword(s)identityen
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Keyword(s)social normsen
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Keyword(s)moralsen
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Keyword(s)greeden
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Keyword(s)psychologyen
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Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)150
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TitleIncentives and Prosocial Behavioren
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DRO typereport
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Visible tag(s)PsyDok