Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence
Author(s) / Creator(s)
Eriksson, Tor
Poulsen, Anders
Villeval, Marie-Claire
Abstract / Description
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated feedback. The pay schemes are a piece rate payment scheme and a winner-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer effects in the piece-rate pay scheme. In contrast, in the tournament scheme we find some evidence of positive peer
effects since the underdogs almost never quit the competition even when lagging significantly behind, and frontrunners do not slack off. Moreover, in both pay schemes information feedback reduces the quality of the low performers' work.
Keyword(s)
Leistung Wettkampf Experiment Peer-Effekt Bezahlung Feedback performance pay tournament piece rate peer effects feedback experimentPersistent Identifier
Date of first publication
2008
Is part of series
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;3440
Citation
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dp3440.pdfAdobe PDF - 860.97KBMD5: e228c932e55b9eb4adcb2a1d372c4585
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There are no other versions of this object.
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Eriksson, Tor
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Poulsen, Anders
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Villeval, Marie-Claire
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PsychArchives acquisition timestamp2022-11-17T11:03:26Z
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Made available on2008-05-28
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Made available on2015-12-01T10:32:07Z
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Made available on2022-11-17T11:03:26Z
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Date of first publication2008
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Abstract / DescriptionThis paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated feedback. The pay schemes are a piece rate payment scheme and a winner-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer effects in the piece-rate pay scheme. In contrast, in the tournament scheme we find some evidence of positive peer effects since the underdogs almost never quit the competition even when lagging significantly behind, and frontrunners do not slack off. Moreover, in both pay schemes information feedback reduces the quality of the low performers' work.en
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Persistent Identifierhttps://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bsz:291-psydok-15938
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Persistent Identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11780/1059
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Persistent Identifierhttps://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.8994
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Language of contenteng
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Is part ofIZA Discussion Papers No. 3440
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Is part of seriesForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;3440
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Keyword(s)Leistungde
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Keyword(s)Wettkampfde
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Keyword(s)Experimentde
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Keyword(s)Peer-Effektde
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Keyword(s)Bezahlungde
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Keyword(s)Feedbackde
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Keyword(s)performance payen
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Keyword(s)tournamenten
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Keyword(s)piece rateen
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Keyword(s)peer effectsen
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Keyword(s)feedbacken
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Keyword(s)experimenten
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Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)150
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TitleFeedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidenceen
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DRO typereport
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Visible tag(s)PsyDok