Incentive Design and Trust: Comparing the Effects of Tournament and Team-Based Incentives on Trust
Author(s) / Creator(s)
Oxoby, Robert J.
Friedrich, Colette
Abstract / Description
We explore the extent to which the structure of incentives affects trust. We hypothesize that the degree to which different incentive mechanisms emphasize competition (via the perceived intentions of others) and entitlements (via the perceived property rights) will affect individuals' subsequent behavior. In our experiment, bargaining pairs earned endowments through either tournaments or team-based incentives. Participants engaged in a subsequent trust game in which the sender had access to the total endowment generated by the pair. We find that the structure of the incentive mechanisms has asymmetric effects on observed trust
in which participants' relative performance framed trusting behavior.
Keyword(s)
Vertrauen Anreiz Experiment Wettbewerb Vertrauen Anreiz Experiment Wettbewerb trust incentives experiments tournamentsPersistent Identifier
Date of first publication
2008
Is part of series
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;3424
Citation
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dp3424.pdfAdobe PDF - 171.1KBMD5: 58948d10046c2d18fea592501c2c3916
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There are no other versions of this object.
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Oxoby, Robert J.
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Friedrich, Colette
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PsychArchives acquisition timestamp2022-11-17T11:04:42Z
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Made available on2008-06-02
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Made available on2015-12-01T10:32:07Z
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Made available on2022-11-17T11:04:42Z
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Date of first publication2008
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Abstract / DescriptionWe explore the extent to which the structure of incentives affects trust. We hypothesize that the degree to which different incentive mechanisms emphasize competition (via the perceived intentions of others) and entitlements (via the perceived property rights) will affect individuals' subsequent behavior. In our experiment, bargaining pairs earned endowments through either tournaments or team-based incentives. Participants engaged in a subsequent trust game in which the sender had access to the total endowment generated by the pair. We find that the structure of the incentive mechanisms has asymmetric effects on observed trust in which participants' relative performance framed trusting behavior.en
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Persistent Identifierhttps://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bsz:291-psydok-15962
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Persistent Identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11780/1063
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Persistent Identifierhttps://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.9046
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Language of contenteng
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Is part ofIZA Discussion Paper Series No. 3424
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Is part of seriesForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;3424
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Keyword(s)Vertrauende
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Keyword(s)Anreizde
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Keyword(s)Experimentde
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Keyword(s)Wettbewerbde
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Keyword(s)Vertrauende
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Keyword(s)Anreizde
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Keyword(s)Experimentde
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Keyword(s)Wettbewerbde
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Keyword(s)trusten
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Keyword(s)incentivesen
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Keyword(s)experimentsen
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Keyword(s)tournamentsen
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Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)150
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TitleIncentive Design and Trust: Comparing the Effects of Tournament and Team-Based Incentives on Trusten
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DRO typereport
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Visible tag(s)PsyDok