Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance
Author(s) / Creator(s)
Ferraz, Claudio
Finan, Frederico
Abstract / Description
Recent studies have emphasized the importance of the quality of politicians for good government and consequently economic performance. But if the quality of leadership matters, then understanding what motivates individuals to become politicians and perform competently in office becomes a central question. In this paper, we examine whether higher wages attract better quality politicians and improve political performance using exogenous variation in the salaries' of local legislators across Brazil's municipal governments. The analysis exploits discontinuities in wages across municipalities induced by a constitutional
amendment defining caps on the salary of local legislatures according to municipal population. Our main findings show that increases in salaries not only attracts more candidates, but more educated ones. Elected officials are in turn more educated and stay in office longer. Higher salaries also increase legislative productivity as measured by the number of bills submitted and approved, and the provision of public goods.
Keyword(s)
Politiker Gehalt Qualität Politiker Gehalt Qualität politician salary quality political agencyPersistent Identifier
Date of first publication
2008
Is part of series
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;3411
Citation
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dp3411.pdfAdobe PDF - 879.98KBMD5: 49f6ea4f25d62790035d231ba412bc3c
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There are no other versions of this object.
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Ferraz, Claudio
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Finan, Frederico
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PsychArchives acquisition timestamp2022-11-17T11:05:22Z
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Made available on2008-06-02
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Made available on2015-12-01T10:32:07Z
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Made available on2022-11-17T11:05:22Z
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Date of first publication2008
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Abstract / DescriptionRecent studies have emphasized the importance of the quality of politicians for good government and consequently economic performance. But if the quality of leadership matters, then understanding what motivates individuals to become politicians and perform competently in office becomes a central question. In this paper, we examine whether higher wages attract better quality politicians and improve political performance using exogenous variation in the salaries' of local legislators across Brazil's municipal governments. The analysis exploits discontinuities in wages across municipalities induced by a constitutional amendment defining caps on the salary of local legislatures according to municipal population. Our main findings show that increases in salaries not only attracts more candidates, but more educated ones. Elected officials are in turn more educated and stay in office longer. Higher salaries also increase legislative productivity as measured by the number of bills submitted and approved, and the provision of public goods.en
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Persistent Identifierhttps://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bsz:291-psydok-16025
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Persistent Identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11780/1065
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Persistent Identifierhttps://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.9072
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Language of contenteng
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Is part ofIZA Discussion Paper Series No. 3411
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Is part of seriesForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;3411
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Keyword(s)Politikerde
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Keyword(s)Gehaltde
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Keyword(s)Qualitätde
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Keyword(s)Politikerde
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Keyword(s)Gehaltde
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Keyword(s)Qualitätde
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Keyword(s)politician salaryen
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Keyword(s)qualityen
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Keyword(s)political agencyen
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Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)150
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TitleMotivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performanceen
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DRO typereport
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Visible tag(s)PsyDok