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Titel: Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?
Autor(en): Coricelli, Giorgio
Joffily, Mateus
Montmarquette, Claude
Villeval, Marie-Claire
Erscheinungsdatum: 2007
Serie/Report Nr.: Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;3103
Zusammenfassung: The economic models of tax compliance predict that individuals should evade taxes when the expected benefit of cheating is greater than its expected cost. When this condition is fulfilled, the high compliance however observed remains a puzzle. In this paper, we investigate the role of emotions as a possible explanation of tax compliance. Our laboratory experiment shows that emotional arousal, measured by Skin Conductance Responses, increases in the proportion of evaded taxes. The perspective of punishment after an audit, especially when the pictures of the evaders are publicly displayed, also raises emotions. We show that an audit policy that induces shame on the evaders favors compliance.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11780/1077
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