Comparing Students to Workers: The Effects of Social Framing on Behavior in Distribution Games
Author(s) / Creator(s)
Carpenter, Jeffrey
Burks, Stephen
Verhoogen, Eric
Abstract / Description
To investigate the external validity of Ultimatum and Dictator game behavior we conduct experiments in field settings with naturally occurring variation in 'social framing.' Our participants are students at Middlebury College, non-traditional students at Kansas City Kansas Community College (KCKCC), and employees at a Kansas City distribution center. Ultimatum game offers are ordered: KCKCC > employee > Middlebury. In the Dictator game employees are more generous than students in either location. This indicates that workers behaved distinctly from both student groups because their allocations do not decrease between games, an effect we attribute to the social framing of the workplace.
Keyword(s)
Spiel Fairness Reziprozität Experiment Student Arbeiter Spiel Fairness Reziprozität Experiment Student Arbeiter Ultimatum game Dictator game fairness reciprocity field experimentPersistent Identifier
Date of first publication
2004
Is part of series
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;1341
Citation
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dp1341.pdfAdobe PDF - 800.33KBMD5: a9a9f5d7101b7d948f0000c609b9c564
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There are no other versions of this object.
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Carpenter, Jeffrey
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Burks, Stephen
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Verhoogen, Eric
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PsychArchives acquisition timestamp2022-11-17T11:02:29Z
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Made available on2008-06-30
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Made available on2015-12-01T10:32:15Z
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Made available on2022-11-17T11:02:29Z
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Date of first publication2004
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Abstract / DescriptionTo investigate the external validity of Ultimatum and Dictator game behavior we conduct experiments in field settings with naturally occurring variation in 'social framing.' Our participants are students at Middlebury College, non-traditional students at Kansas City Kansas Community College (KCKCC), and employees at a Kansas City distribution center. Ultimatum game offers are ordered: KCKCC > employee > Middlebury. In the Dictator game employees are more generous than students in either location. This indicates that workers behaved distinctly from both student groups because their allocations do not decrease between games, an effect we attribute to the social framing of the workplace.en
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Persistent Identifierhttps://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bsz:291-psydok-16728
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Persistent Identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11780/1143
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Persistent Identifierhttps://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.8943
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Language of contenteng
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Is part ofIZA Discussion Paper Series No. 1341
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Is part of seriesForschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;1341
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Keyword(s)Spielde
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Keyword(s)Fairnessde
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Keyword(s)Reziprozitätde
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Keyword(s)Experimentde
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Keyword(s)Studentde
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Keyword(s)Arbeiterde
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Keyword(s)Spielde
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Keyword(s)Fairnessde
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Keyword(s)Reziprozitätde
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Keyword(s)Experimentde
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Keyword(s)Studentde
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Keyword(s)Arbeiterde
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Keyword(s)Ultimatum gameen
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Keyword(s)Dictator gameen
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Keyword(s)fairnessen
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Keyword(s)reciprocityen
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Keyword(s)field experimenten
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Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)150
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TitleComparing Students to Workers: The Effects of Social Framing on Behavior in Distribution Gamesen
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DRO typereport
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Visible tag(s)PsyDok