Report

A Conceptual Analysis of Justification of Action and the Introduction of the Prescriptive Attribution Concept.

Author(s) / Creator(s)

Gollan, Tobias
Witte, Erich H.

Abstract / Description

This paper proposes a conceptual framework to investigate how people con-strue justification of their behavior. It is derived on the basis of two lines of thought in Heider's influential 1958 publication: the conception of ?ought and value', and the conception of the naïve scientist engaged in behavior explana-tion (?reason attribution'). According to Heider, 'oughts' constitute socially shared standards for evaluating behavior as ?right' or ?wrong'. They are, conse-quently, essential for ethically justifying behavior. It is argued that justification is parallel to the concept of reason attribution regarding logic, and thus can be conceived as ?prescriptive attribution'. Similarities and dissimilarities of both concepts are discussed, research on prescriptive attribution is presented, and strategies as well as the potential merit of future research are shown.

Keyword(s)

Ethik Moral Wert Attribution Schlussfolgern Ethik Attribution Moral Schlussfolgerndes Denken Werte justification of actions prescriptive attribution reason attribution behavior explanation practical philosophy ethics

Persistent Identifier

Date of first publication

2008

Is part of series

Hamburger Forschungsberichte zur Sozialpsychologie;81

Citation

  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Gollan, Tobias
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Witte, Erich H.
  • PsychArchives acquisition timestamp
    2022-11-17T11:08:08Z
  • Made available on
    2008-12-11
  • Made available on
    2015-12-01T10:30:40Z
  • Made available on
    2022-11-17T11:08:08Z
  • Date of first publication
    2008
  • Abstract / Description
    This paper proposes a conceptual framework to investigate how people con-strue justification of their behavior. It is derived on the basis of two lines of thought in Heider's influential 1958 publication: the conception of ?ought and value', and the conception of the naïve scientist engaged in behavior explana-tion (?reason attribution'). According to Heider, 'oughts' constitute socially shared standards for evaluating behavior as ?right' or ?wrong'. They are, conse-quently, essential for ethically justifying behavior. It is argued that justification is parallel to the concept of reason attribution regarding logic, and thus can be conceived as ?prescriptive attribution'. Similarities and dissimilarities of both concepts are discussed, research on prescriptive attribution is presented, and strategies as well as the potential merit of future research are shown.
    en
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bsz:291-psydok-23444
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11780/537
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.9164
  • Language of content
    eng
  • Is part of series
    Hamburger Forschungsberichte zur Sozialpsychologie;81
  • Keyword(s)
    Ethik
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Moral
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Wert
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Attribution
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Schlussfolgern
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Ethik
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Attribution
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Moral
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Schlussfolgerndes Denken
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Werte
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    justification of actions
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    prescriptive attribution
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    reason attribution
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    behavior explanation
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    practical philosophy
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    ethics
    en
  • Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)
    150
  • Title
    A Conceptual Analysis of Justification of Action and the Introduction of the Prescriptive Attribution Concept.
    en
  • DRO type
    report
  • Visible tag(s)
    PsyDok