A Conceptual Analysis of Justification of Action and the Introduction of the Prescriptive Attribution Concept.
Author(s) / Creator(s)
Gollan, Tobias
Witte, Erich H.
Abstract / Description
This paper proposes a conceptual framework to investigate how people con-strue justification of their behavior. It is derived on the basis of two lines of thought in Heider's influential 1958 publication: the conception of ?ought and value', and the conception of the naïve scientist engaged in behavior explana-tion (?reason attribution'). According to Heider, 'oughts' constitute socially shared standards for evaluating behavior as ?right' or ?wrong'. They are, conse-quently, essential for ethically justifying behavior. It is argued that justification is parallel to the concept of reason attribution regarding logic, and thus can be conceived as ?prescriptive attribution'. Similarities and dissimilarities of both concepts are discussed, research on prescriptive attribution is presented, and strategies as well as the potential merit of future research are shown.
Keyword(s)
Ethik Moral Wert Attribution Schlussfolgern Ethik Attribution Moral Schlussfolgerndes Denken Werte justification of actions prescriptive attribution reason attribution behavior explanation practical philosophy ethicsPersistent Identifier
Date of first publication
2008
Is part of series
Hamburger Forschungsberichte zur Sozialpsychologie;81
Citation
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HAFOS_81.pdfAdobe PDF - 343.13KBMD5: 623dc300f654e880095555b73b582e6d
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There are no other versions of this object.
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Gollan, Tobias
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Witte, Erich H.
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PsychArchives acquisition timestamp2022-11-17T11:08:08Z
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Made available on2008-12-11
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Made available on2015-12-01T10:30:40Z
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Made available on2022-11-17T11:08:08Z
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Date of first publication2008
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Abstract / DescriptionThis paper proposes a conceptual framework to investigate how people con-strue justification of their behavior. It is derived on the basis of two lines of thought in Heider's influential 1958 publication: the conception of ?ought and value', and the conception of the naïve scientist engaged in behavior explana-tion (?reason attribution'). According to Heider, 'oughts' constitute socially shared standards for evaluating behavior as ?right' or ?wrong'. They are, conse-quently, essential for ethically justifying behavior. It is argued that justification is parallel to the concept of reason attribution regarding logic, and thus can be conceived as ?prescriptive attribution'. Similarities and dissimilarities of both concepts are discussed, research on prescriptive attribution is presented, and strategies as well as the potential merit of future research are shown.en
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Persistent Identifierhttps://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bsz:291-psydok-23444
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Persistent Identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11780/537
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Persistent Identifierhttps://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.9164
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Language of contenteng
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Is part of seriesHamburger Forschungsberichte zur Sozialpsychologie;81
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Keyword(s)Ethikde
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Keyword(s)Moralde
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Keyword(s)Wertde
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Keyword(s)Attributionde
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Keyword(s)Schlussfolgernde
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Keyword(s)Ethikde
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Keyword(s)Attributionde
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Keyword(s)Moralde
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Keyword(s)Schlussfolgerndes Denkende
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Keyword(s)Wertede
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Keyword(s)justification of actionsen
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Keyword(s)prescriptive attributionen
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Keyword(s)reason attributionen
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Keyword(s)behavior explanationen
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Keyword(s)practical philosophyen
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Keyword(s)ethicsen
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Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)150
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TitleA Conceptual Analysis of Justification of Action and the Introduction of the Prescriptive Attribution Concept.en
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DRO typereport
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Visible tag(s)PsyDok