Expectations, attributions and behavior in bargaining with liked and disliked partners
Author(s) / Creator(s)
Brandstätter, Hermann
Abstract / Description
Each of the 128 subjects plays the Harsanyi-Selten bargaining game with incomplete information 8 times, allegedly each time with a randomly selected partner. Actually, in 4 games the partner is simulated by a computer program. Combined with an experimental variation of liking (liking - disliking), costs (low, mixed, high), and dependency, i.e. the possibility of awarding a bonus to the partner at the end of the game (dependent - not dependent) the experiment follows a
2x2x3x2 repeated measures design.
It is predicted that: (1) the probability of deadlock is the same for liking and disliking dyads, (2) in the case of agreement the game reaches its goal faster with a liked partner than with a disliked one, (3) in the case of conflict, the game ends earlier with a disliked partner than with a liked one, (4) the responsibility for deadlock is
attributed more to the partner than to oneself, (5) the credit for agreement is attributed more to oneself than to the partner.
Since the emotional responses to the partner's behavior are measured several times during the bargaining process, the bargaining outcome can be explained in terms of emotional responses to confirmed or disconfirmed expectations.
Keyword(s)
Verhandlung Erwartung Begriffsbildung Soziale Wahrnehmung Kognitive Entwicklung Begriff Attribution Verhandlung Erwartung Begriffsbildung Soziale Wahrnehmung Kognitive Entwicklung Begriffe Attribution Bargaining Expectation Concept Formation Social Perception Cognitive Development Concepts AttributionPersistent Identifier
Date of first publication
1983
Is part of
In: Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making Proceedings of the Third Conference on Experimental Economics, Winzenhohl, Germany August 29-September 3,1982 Edited by Reinhard Tietz
Citation
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Expectations_attribution_and_behavior_in_bargaining_with_liked_and_disliked_partners1.pdfAdobe PDF - 2MBMD5: a54cea3128924bc31f0c660eedeada31
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There are no other versions of this object.
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Brandstätter, Hermann
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PsychArchives acquisition timestamp2022-11-21T13:55:12Z
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Made available on2014-07-17
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Made available on2015-12-01T10:31:15Z
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Made available on2022-11-21T13:55:12Z
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Date of first publication1983
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Abstract / DescriptionEach of the 128 subjects plays the Harsanyi-Selten bargaining game with incomplete information 8 times, allegedly each time with a randomly selected partner. Actually, in 4 games the partner is simulated by a computer program. Combined with an experimental variation of liking (liking - disliking), costs (low, mixed, high), and dependency, i.e. the possibility of awarding a bonus to the partner at the end of the game (dependent - not dependent) the experiment follows a 2x2x3x2 repeated measures design. It is predicted that: (1) the probability of deadlock is the same for liking and disliking dyads, (2) in the case of agreement the game reaches its goal faster with a liked partner than with a disliked one, (3) in the case of conflict, the game ends earlier with a disliked partner than with a liked one, (4) the responsibility for deadlock is attributed more to the partner than to oneself, (5) the credit for agreement is attributed more to oneself than to the partner. Since the emotional responses to the partner's behavior are measured several times during the bargaining process, the bargaining outcome can be explained in terms of emotional responses to confirmed or disconfirmed expectations.en
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Publication statusunknown
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Review statusunknown
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Persistent Identifierhttps://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bsz:291-psydok-39602
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Persistent Identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11780/841
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Persistent Identifierhttps://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.10097
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Language of contenteng
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Is part ofIn: Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making Proceedings of the Third Conference on Experimental Economics, Winzenhohl, Germany August 29-September 3,1982 Edited by Reinhard Tietz
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Keyword(s)Verhandlungde
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Keyword(s)Erwartungde
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Keyword(s)Begriffsbildungde
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Keyword(s)Soziale Wahrnehmungde
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Keyword(s)Kognitive Entwicklungde
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Keyword(s)Begriffde
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Keyword(s)Attributionde
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Keyword(s)Verhandlungde
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Keyword(s)Erwartungde
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Keyword(s)Begriffsbildungde
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Keyword(s)Soziale Wahrnehmungde
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Keyword(s)Kognitive Entwicklungde
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Keyword(s)Begriffede
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Keyword(s)Attributionde
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Keyword(s)Bargainingen
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Keyword(s)Expectationen
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Keyword(s)Concept Formationen
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Keyword(s)Social Perceptionen
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Keyword(s)Cognitive Developmenten
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Keyword(s)Conceptsen
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Keyword(s)Attributionen
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Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)150
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TitleExpectations, attributions and behavior in bargaining with liked and disliked partnersen
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DRO typebookPart
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Visible tag(s)PsyDok