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|Titel:||Expectations, attributions and behavior in bargaining with liked and disliked partners|
|Zusammenfassung:||Each of the 128 subjects plays the Harsanyi-Selten bargaining game with incomplete information 8 times, allegedly each time with a randomly selected partner. Actually, in 4 games the partner is simulated by a computer program. Combined with an experimental variation of liking (liking - disliking), costs (low, mixed, high), and dependency, i.e. the possibility of awarding a bonus to the partner at the end of the game (dependent - not dependent) the experiment follows a 2x2x3x2 repeated measures design. It is predicted that: (1) the probability of deadlock is the same for liking and disliking dyads, (2) in the case of agreement the game reaches its goal faster with a liked partner than with a disliked one, (3) in the case of conflict, the game ends earlier with a disliked partner than with a liked one, (4) the responsibility for deadlock is attributed more to the partner than to oneself, (5) the credit for agreement is attributed more to oneself than to the partner. Since the emotional responses to the partner's behavior are measured several times during the bargaining process, the bargaining outcome can be explained in terms of emotional responses to confirmed or disconfirmed expectations.|
|Enthalten in den Sammlungen:||PsyDok|
Dateien zu dieser Ressource:
|Expectations_attribution_and_behavior_in_bargaining_with_liked_and_disliked_partners1.pdf||1,96 MB||Adobe PDF||Öffnen/Anzeigen|
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