Book Part

Expectations, attributions and behavior in bargaining with liked and disliked partners

Author(s) / Creator(s)

Brandstätter, Hermann

Abstract / Description

Each of the 128 subjects plays the Harsanyi-Selten bargaining game with incomplete information 8 times, allegedly each time with a randomly selected partner. Actually, in 4 games the partner is simulated by a computer program. Combined with an experimental variation of liking (liking - disliking), costs (low, mixed, high), and dependency, i.e. the possibility of awarding a bonus to the partner at the end of the game (dependent - not dependent) the experiment follows a 2x2x3x2 repeated measures design. It is predicted that: (1) the probability of deadlock is the same for liking and disliking dyads, (2) in the case of agreement the game reaches its goal faster with a liked partner than with a disliked one, (3) in the case of conflict, the game ends earlier with a disliked partner than with a liked one, (4) the responsibility for deadlock is attributed more to the partner than to oneself, (5) the credit for agreement is attributed more to oneself than to the partner. Since the emotional responses to the partner's behavior are measured several times during the bargaining process, the bargaining outcome can be explained in terms of emotional responses to confirmed or disconfirmed expectations.

Keyword(s)

Verhandlung Erwartung Begriffsbildung Soziale Wahrnehmung Kognitive Entwicklung Begriff Attribution Verhandlung Erwartung Begriffsbildung Soziale Wahrnehmung Kognitive Entwicklung Begriffe Attribution Bargaining Expectation Concept Formation Social Perception Cognitive Development Concepts Attribution

Persistent Identifier

Date of first publication

1983

Is part of

In: Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making Proceedings of the Third Conference on Experimental Economics, Winzenhohl, Germany August 29-September 3,1982 Edited by Reinhard Tietz

Citation

  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Brandstätter, Hermann
  • PsychArchives acquisition timestamp
    2022-11-21T13:55:12Z
  • Made available on
    2014-07-17
  • Made available on
    2015-12-01T10:31:15Z
  • Made available on
    2022-11-21T13:55:12Z
  • Date of first publication
    1983
  • Abstract / Description
    Each of the 128 subjects plays the Harsanyi-Selten bargaining game with incomplete information 8 times, allegedly each time with a randomly selected partner. Actually, in 4 games the partner is simulated by a computer program. Combined with an experimental variation of liking (liking - disliking), costs (low, mixed, high), and dependency, i.e. the possibility of awarding a bonus to the partner at the end of the game (dependent - not dependent) the experiment follows a 2x2x3x2 repeated measures design. It is predicted that: (1) the probability of deadlock is the same for liking and disliking dyads, (2) in the case of agreement the game reaches its goal faster with a liked partner than with a disliked one, (3) in the case of conflict, the game ends earlier with a disliked partner than with a liked one, (4) the responsibility for deadlock is attributed more to the partner than to oneself, (5) the credit for agreement is attributed more to oneself than to the partner. Since the emotional responses to the partner's behavior are measured several times during the bargaining process, the bargaining outcome can be explained in terms of emotional responses to confirmed or disconfirmed expectations.
    en
  • Publication status
    unknown
  • Review status
    unknown
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bsz:291-psydok-39602
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11780/841
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.10097
  • Language of content
    eng
  • Is part of
    In: Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making Proceedings of the Third Conference on Experimental Economics, Winzenhohl, Germany August 29-September 3,1982 Edited by Reinhard Tietz
  • Keyword(s)
    Verhandlung
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Erwartung
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Begriffsbildung
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Soziale Wahrnehmung
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Kognitive Entwicklung
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Begriff
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Attribution
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Verhandlung
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Erwartung
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Begriffsbildung
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Soziale Wahrnehmung
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Kognitive Entwicklung
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Begriffe
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Attribution
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Bargaining
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    Expectation
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    Concept Formation
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    Social Perception
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    Cognitive Development
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    Concepts
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    Attribution
    en
  • Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)
    150
  • Title
    Expectations, attributions and behavior in bargaining with liked and disliked partners
    en
  • DRO type
    bookPart
  • Visible tag(s)
    PsyDok