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Incentive Design and Trust: Comparing the Effects of Tournament and Team-Based Incentives on Trust

Author(s) / Creator(s)

Oxoby, Robert J.
Friedrich, Colette

Abstract / Description

We explore the extent to which the structure of incentives affects trust. We hypothesize that the degree to which different incentive mechanisms emphasize competition (via the perceived intentions of others) and entitlements (via the perceived property rights) will affect individuals' subsequent behavior. In our experiment, bargaining pairs earned endowments through either tournaments or team-based incentives. Participants engaged in a subsequent trust game in which the sender had access to the total endowment generated by the pair. We find that the structure of the incentive mechanisms has asymmetric effects on observed trust in which participants' relative performance framed trusting behavior.

Keyword(s)

Vertrauen Anreiz Experiment Wettbewerb Vertrauen Anreiz Experiment Wettbewerb trust incentives experiments tournaments

Persistent Identifier

Date of first publication

2008

Is part of series

Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;3424

Citation

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  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Oxoby, Robert J.
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Friedrich, Colette
  • PsychArchives acquisition timestamp
    2022-11-17T11:04:42Z
  • Made available on
    2008-06-02
  • Made available on
    2015-12-01T10:32:07Z
  • Made available on
    2022-11-17T11:04:42Z
  • Date of first publication
    2008
  • Abstract / Description
    We explore the extent to which the structure of incentives affects trust. We hypothesize that the degree to which different incentive mechanisms emphasize competition (via the perceived intentions of others) and entitlements (via the perceived property rights) will affect individuals' subsequent behavior. In our experiment, bargaining pairs earned endowments through either tournaments or team-based incentives. Participants engaged in a subsequent trust game in which the sender had access to the total endowment generated by the pair. We find that the structure of the incentive mechanisms has asymmetric effects on observed trust in which participants' relative performance framed trusting behavior.
    en
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bsz:291-psydok-15962
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11780/1063
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.9046
  • Language of content
    eng
  • Is part of
    IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 3424
  • Is part of series
    Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;3424
  • Keyword(s)
    Vertrauen
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Anreiz
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Experiment
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Wettbewerb
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Vertrauen
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Anreiz
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Experiment
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Wettbewerb
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    trust
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    incentives
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    experiments
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    tournaments
    en
  • Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)
    150
  • Title
    Incentive Design and Trust: Comparing the Effects of Tournament and Team-Based Incentives on Trust
    en
  • DRO type
    report
  • Visible tag(s)
    PsyDok