Report

Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance

Author(s) / Creator(s)

Ferraz, Claudio
Finan, Frederico

Abstract / Description

Recent studies have emphasized the importance of the quality of politicians for good government and consequently economic performance. But if the quality of leadership matters, then understanding what motivates individuals to become politicians and perform competently in office becomes a central question. In this paper, we examine whether higher wages attract better quality politicians and improve political performance using exogenous variation in the salaries' of local legislators across Brazil's municipal governments. The analysis exploits discontinuities in wages across municipalities induced by a constitutional amendment defining caps on the salary of local legislatures according to municipal population. Our main findings show that increases in salaries not only attracts more candidates, but more educated ones. Elected officials are in turn more educated and stay in office longer. Higher salaries also increase legislative productivity as measured by the number of bills submitted and approved, and the provision of public goods.

Keyword(s)

Politiker Gehalt Qualität Politiker Gehalt Qualität politician salary quality political agency

Persistent Identifier

Date of first publication

2008

Is part of series

Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;3411

Citation

  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Ferraz, Claudio
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Finan, Frederico
  • PsychArchives acquisition timestamp
    2022-11-17T11:05:22Z
  • Made available on
    2008-06-02
  • Made available on
    2015-12-01T10:32:07Z
  • Made available on
    2022-11-17T11:05:22Z
  • Date of first publication
    2008
  • Abstract / Description
    Recent studies have emphasized the importance of the quality of politicians for good government and consequently economic performance. But if the quality of leadership matters, then understanding what motivates individuals to become politicians and perform competently in office becomes a central question. In this paper, we examine whether higher wages attract better quality politicians and improve political performance using exogenous variation in the salaries' of local legislators across Brazil's municipal governments. The analysis exploits discontinuities in wages across municipalities induced by a constitutional amendment defining caps on the salary of local legislatures according to municipal population. Our main findings show that increases in salaries not only attracts more candidates, but more educated ones. Elected officials are in turn more educated and stay in office longer. Higher salaries also increase legislative productivity as measured by the number of bills submitted and approved, and the provision of public goods.
    en
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bsz:291-psydok-16025
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11780/1065
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.9072
  • Language of content
    eng
  • Is part of
    IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 3411
  • Is part of series
    Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;3411
  • Keyword(s)
    Politiker
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Gehalt
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Qualität
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Politiker
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Gehalt
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Qualität
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    politician salary
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    quality
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    political agency
    en
  • Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)
    150
  • Title
    Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance
    en
  • DRO type
    report
  • Visible tag(s)
    PsyDok