Report

Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

Author(s) / Creator(s)

Bénabou, Roland
Tirole, Jean

Abstract / Description

We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this 'overjustification effect' can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the choice by public and private sponsors of incentive levels, their degree of confidentiality and the publicity given to agents' behavior. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.

Keyword(s)

Altruismus Belohnung Motivation Prestige Norm Moral Begierde Psychologie Altruismus Belohnung Motivation Prestige Norm Moral Begierde Psychologie altruism rewards motivation esteem crowding out overjustification effect identity social norms morals greed psychology

Persistent Identifier

Date of first publication

2005

Is part of series

Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;1695

Citation

  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Bénabou, Roland
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Tirole, Jean
  • PsychArchives acquisition timestamp
    2022-11-17T11:06:52Z
  • Made available on
    2008-06-06
  • Made available on
    2015-12-01T10:32:11Z
  • Made available on
    2022-11-17T11:06:52Z
  • Date of first publication
    2005
  • Abstract / Description
    We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this 'overjustification effect' can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the choice by public and private sponsors of incentive levels, their degree of confidentiality and the publicity given to agents' behavior. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.
    en
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bsz:291-psydok-16636
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11780/1104
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.9121
  • Language of content
    eng
  • Is part of
    IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 1695
  • Is part of series
    Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/ Institute for the Study of Labor: IZA Discussion Paper Series;1695
  • Keyword(s)
    Altruismus
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Belohnung
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Motivation
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Prestige
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Norm
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Moral
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Begierde
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Psychologie
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Altruismus
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Belohnung
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Motivation
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Prestige
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Norm
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Moral
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Begierde
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    Psychologie
    de
  • Keyword(s)
    altruism
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    rewards
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    motivation
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    esteem
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    crowding out
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    overjustification effect
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    identity
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    social norms
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    morals
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    greed
    en
  • Keyword(s)
    psychology
    en
  • Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)
    150
  • Title
    Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
    en
  • DRO type
    report
  • Visible tag(s)
    PsyDok